La transition haïtienne arrive à échéance. Et après ?

Haiti’s Transition Faces a Deadline. What Comes Next?

By Patrick Prézeau Stephenson (Le Français suit)

PORT-AU-PRINCE — Haiti’s transition is running on borrowed time. With roughly three months left before the mandate of the nine-member Presidential Transitional Council (CPT) expires in early February, the question that has stalked this process from the beginning has returned to the center: who governs after February 7 — and on what authority?

The Caribbean Community’s Eminent Persons Group, which helped midwife the current arrangement, has written to the April 3, 2024 Accord signatories asking them to state, in writing, how they believe the transition should end and what should come next. The note, conveyed this week by Ambassador Colin Granderson and seen by Haitian media, comes after months of private prodding. The signatories, many of whom have not met collectively since 2024 to review the CPT’s performance, are now being asked to take public positions.

Inside the CPT, consultations are also underway. Council members have opened talks with political parties — including EDE, INITE, the “21 Décembre” coalition, INFÒS and the SDP — and with influential religious bodies, from the Protestant Federation to the Konvansyon Nasyonal Vodouyizan Ayisyen (KNVA). The stated aim is to find enough consensus to avoid a legitimacy crisis the morning after February 7, 2026.

Who signed — and who didn’t

The April 3 Accord brought together a broad array of actors:

· Political parties and figures: Force Louverturienne Réformiste, Parti ENA, Mouvement National pour la Transparence, Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtiens, OPL, KID, Parti Dessalinien, RDNP; and personalities such as Antoine Rodon Bien-Aimé, Edgard Leblanc Fils and Jean Charles Moïse.

· Civil society and religious sector: Collectif Défenseurs Plus, Fondation Je Klere, CARDH, OCID; representatives from the Catholic bishops’ conference, Protestant federations and recognized vodou leaders.

· Economic sector: ADIH, CCIH and the Forum Économique du Secteur Privé.

It is noteworthy that the Montana group — although the architect of previous transition proposals — does not appear among the groups formally consulted. They had proposed the economist Fritz Jean to sit on the CPT, before breaking with the body — a reminder of the fragility of coalition discipline from the beginning. Scandals involving three council members have severely weakened the body and eroded its credibility, amid poor results in improving security, advancing constitutional reform, and organizing credible elections.

What has worked — and what hasn’t

The inclusive design gave the council breadth but not always coherence. The strengths are evident: plural representation across parties, human-rights organizations with credibility in watchdog roles, religious institutions that can legitimize compromise, and private-sector groups capable of mobilizing resources when security stabilizes.

The liabilities are just as clear: chronic fragmentation among parties, weak collective discipline among signatories, limited operational coordination between civil and religious actors, and public skepticism toward business elites. Above all, the CPT has struggled to convert political inclusion into a shared strategy with measurable milestones — on security, elections and service delivery.

A mandate running out

As of late October, the transition faces four interlocking pressures:

· Time: The CPT’s mandate ends in early February. There is no consensus on extension or succession.

· Legitimacy: Many original signatories now call for the council to depart on February 7 but have not united behind a post-CPT blueprint.

· Security: The Kenya-led mission authorized in 2023 has evolved into a more muscular Gang Suppression Force under U.N. authority; its effectiveness — and public acceptance — will hinge on visible Haitian leadership and safeguards for civilians.

· Elections: The calendar is aspirational, not operational. Credible voting requires minimum security, logistics and trust that are uneven across the country.

Three plausible paths

Barring a dramatic breakthrough, Haiti’s political class will choose among three imperfect options:

1. Time-bound extension with conditions. Extend the CPT for a fixed, short period tied to explicit benchmarks: security corridors kept open, a vetted electoral administration appointed, funding and logistics locked in, and a non-negotiable election window. This demands independent monitoring and consequences for slippage.

2. Narrow caretaker and phased elections. Replace or slim down the council, build a technocratic caretaker focused on security and electoral logistics, and stage elections in two or three tranches, beginning where security and administration allow. This trades speed for credibility step by step.

3. Reset through a broader compact. Convene signatories, major non-signatories (including the Montana group), religious authorities and the private sector to re-charter the transition with a new governing compact and a smaller executive core. This is the most legitimate on paper and the hardest to execute on time.

What it would take to steady the landing

Regardless of the path, five practical steps would improve the odds:

· A public mandate decision by mid-November. The signatories should answer CARICOM’s letter with a unified position on extension, succession, or re-charter — including names for an electoral council, an agreed election window and the rules of the game during the campaign.

· Benchmarks that matter. Publish a monthly dashboard: main corridors open (and for how many hours), kidnapping and extortion trends, police units vetted and deployed, pretrial detention reduced, procurement made public. Legitimacy grows when citizens can verify progress.

· Guardrails for the security mission. Haitian National Police primacy; vetted units up front; civilian-protection protocols and incident reporting in public; no parallel chains of command. Force can clear streets; only trust keeps them open.

· A real interface with society. Create a compact with civil society, religious authorities and the private sector to mediate disputes, protect reformers and whistle-blowers, and prevent election-season violence.

· Financing and logistics locked early. Election logistics, policing support and justice throughput require money, fuel, secure warehousing and trained personnel now — not six weeks before a vote.

The risk of drift

The greatest danger is not a wrong decision but no decision: a quiet slide past the mandate’s end, with competing claims to authority and the security mission left to manage political ambiguity it cannot solve. Haitians have seen that movie before: stalemate at the top, improvisation in the streets, and another lurch of public trust downward.

CARICOM’s intervention forces the question. The council can spend its last weeks bargaining for new time, or it can spend them building the proof points of a credible handover. The choice will tell Haitians — and the world — something fundamental about where this transition is headed, and whether the country’s politics can finally deliver more than a promise.