Haïti Se Dirige-t-il Vers une Farce Sécuritaire Avec une MMSS Édentée?

Is Haiti Heading For A Security Farce With A Toothless MMSS?

By Patrick Prézeau Stephenson (Le français suit)

The recent announcement by Leslie Voltaire, a member of the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT), that Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MMSS) forces will not directly engage Haitian gangs, in an interview with France 24 on Tuesday, May 21, raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of this international security mission [1,2]. Add to this the news that the CPT has appointed a National Security Council (NSC) whose composition remains unknown, as well as reported delays in the acquisition of essential military equipment, and there is growing uncertainty about the ability of the MMSS mission to restore stability in Haiti [3,4]. This essay explores whether Haiti is indeed headed for a toothless MMSS and the implications of such a development.

Context and Challenges

Haiti is in the throes of a severe security crisis, with gangs controlling large swathes of the capital, Port-au-Prince. The Haitian National Police (PNH) is overwhelmed, and the country’s military is modestly equipped, struggling to maintain order. The deployment of the Kenyan-led MSS, comprising 2,500 troops, was seen as a critical step in addressing this instability. However, several recent developments threaten to undermine the mission's effectiveness.

The MSS's Limited Engagement

Leslie Voltaire’s statement that the MSS will not directly confront the gangs is a significant departure from the initial expectations. If the MSS troops are not to engage in direct combat, their role might be relegated to a supportive or advisory capacity, which may not suffice given the intensity of the gang violence. This approach could render the MSS mission less impactful, effectively toothless in the face of well-armed and organized criminal factions.

1. Strategic Limitations:

· Without direct engagement, the MSS forces will likely focus on training, logistics, and strategic support. While these areas are critical, they do not address the immediate threat posed by the gangs.

· The Kenyan forces have substantial counter-terrorism experience, particularly against Al Shabaab. However, this expertise may be underutilized if they are not permitted to apply their combat skills directly in the volatile Haitian context.

2. Operational Inefficiencies:

· The delay in acquiring armored vehicles, helicopters, and communication equipment further hampers the MSS’s readiness. Effective urban warfare and crisis response require robust logistical and operational frameworks, which are currently lacking.

· The reported lack of necessary medical evacuation procedures is particularly concerning, as it compromises the safety and morale of the troops.

The Role and Composition of the CNS

The establishment of a Conseil National de Securité (CNS) by the CPT adds another layer of complexity. The secrecy surrounding its composition raises questions about its legitimacy and effectiveness. The CNS is expected to oversee security operations, but without clarity on its members' expertise and mandate, its ability to coordinate effectively with the MSS and the PNH remains doubtful.

1. Governance and Coordination:

· The CNS needs to have members with significant security and strategic experience to be effective. Its undisclosed composition may indicate internal political maneuvering rather than a focus on practical security needs.

· Effective coordination between the CNS, MSS, and PNH is crucial. Any disconnect could lead to fragmented operations and reduced overall effectiveness.

2. Political Implications:

· The creation of the CNS might be an attempt by the CPT to retain political control over security operations. However, this could lead to conflicts of interest and hinder the mission's operational autonomy.

The Impact of Delays and Equipment Shortages

The Miami Herald’s report on delays in acquiring essential military equipment, such as armored vehicles and helicopters, further complicates the MSS deployment. These delays suggest that the MSS might arrive in Haiti without being fully operational, reducing their immediate effectiveness and increasing the risk to their personnel.

1. Logistical Shortcomings:

· Without the necessary vehicles and communication tools, MSS troops will face significant mobility and coordination challenges. This can limit their ability to respond swiftly to emergencies and conduct effective operations.

· The Biden administration’s stance against deployment without proper medical evacuation procedures highlights the seriousness of these logistical gaps.

2. Operational Readiness:

· The effectiveness of the MSS mission relies heavily on their ability to be fully operational from the start. Delays and equipment shortages undermine this readiness, potentially prolonging the security vacuum in Haiti.

Conclusion

The combination of a non-combative role for the MSS, the uncertain composition of the CNS, and logistical delays all point towards a potentially ineffective international intervention in Haiti. The initial promise of a robust multinational force capable of directly confronting gang violence is being eroded by these developments.

For the MSS mission to succeed, it is imperative that:

The MSS be allowed to engage directly with gangs, leveraging their counter-terrorism expertise.
The CNS be composed of experienced security professionals with clear, transparent mandates.
Logistical and operational challenges be addressed promptly to ensure full operational readiness upon deployment.

Without addressing these critical issues, Haiti risks heading towards a toothless MSS intervention, which would fail to restore stability and security in the nation. The CPT and the international community must act decisively to support a comprehensive and effective security strategy for Haiti.